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Abstract
The question how transparency in organizations affects performance has received
considerable interest from researchers in management, psychology, and organization
science. The widely held view is that transparency benefits organizational perfor-
mance, because it reduces employee uncertainty. However, causal empirical evidence
on the value of transparency and its motivating mechanism is still scarce. In this
paper, we report the findings from an experiment, in which an agent has only prob-
abilistic beliefs about the true state of nature and needs to choose costly effort that
benefits the principal. The true state relates to his fixed-wage, which can either be
high or low. The principal needs to decide whether to create informative transparency
by disclosing the true state to the agent via a costly, fixed-form message. Our results
show a considerable value of transparency: even if transparency involves the disclo-
sure of ’bad news’ (the low state), effort almost doubles relative to non-disclosure.
Looking at the motivating mechanism, we do not find that transparency motivates
primarily because it reduces uncertainty for the agent. Instead, we find that unin-
formative transparency that merely involves communication of already known facts
is equally effective. Many principals, however, misperceive the value of transparency
and disclose information too restrictively.
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principal-agent relationship
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1 Introduction
Economists have long understood that the success of organizations depends on the effective
coordination and motivation of their members (see the recent review by Gibbons & Roberts
2013). Traditionally, research in the area of motivation focused on the influence of monetary
incentives on employee effort in principal-agent relationships (e.g., Holmstrom 1979). Over
the last decade, however, interest in the effectiveness of non-monetary incentives such as
respect, attention, job mission or the allocation of decision rights has been on the rise.1 In
this paper, we report on the findings from a controlled laboratory experiment on another,
non-monetary incentive mechanism: the level of transparency in organizations.
The question how transparency in organizations affects performance has received con-
siderable interest from researchers in management, psychology, and organization science.
Schnackenberg & Tomlinson (2014) offer a comprehensive review of studies in these disci-
plines and define transparency as the "perceived value of intentionally shared information
from a sender" (p. 5). This definition reflects on the authors’ argument that at the heart
of transparency there lies information disclosure, i.e., the timely provision of relevant in-
formation to otherwise uninformed parties, together with information accuracy and clarity.
An emerging view is that transparency benefits organizational performance, because it
contributes to trust in organization-stakeholder relationships (ibid). However, causal em-
pirical evidence on the value of transparency for organizational performance is still scarce,
because the effect of transparency in extant work is often confounded with other important
success factors, such as the pre-existing level of trust in the work environment (Akkermans
et al. 2004). The first goal of our paper is to address this gap in the context of employee
motivation.
A widely held belief is that the value of transparency derives from the disclosure of
1See Ellingsen & Johannesson (2007) on respect, Dur (2009) on attention, Cassar (2014) on job mission,
and Charness et al. (2012) and Fehr et al. (2013) on the allocation of decision rights.
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uncertainty-reducing information to employees. For example, a number of recent articles
in the business press document considerable non-transparency in firms about changes in
corporate policies, goals, visions, and financial results (e.g., CNN-Money 2013, WSJ 2012),
and warn that such uncertainty exposure results in reduced employee commitment and
productivity. Along similar lines, scholars in management and psychology interpret the
disclosure of relevant information that helps employees to "understand and contextualize
their workplace" (p.3) as informational fairness from managers (Collins & Mossholder
2014). Informational fairness in turn represents an important dimension of organizational
justice (Bies 2001), which relates positively to employee trust (Cohen-Charash & Spector
2001) and performance (e.g., Reb et al. (2006), Ambrose et al. (2002), and Sklarlicki &
Folger (1997)). While these are compelling explanations for the value of transparency, they
largely neglect another, potentially motivating mechanism of transparency: the positive
effects of interpersonal communication as a common vehicle for information disclosure.
Considerable evidence in economics demonstrates the broad behavioral impact of inter-
personal communication in strategic interactions. In the context of a weak-link game, for
example, Brandts & Cooper (2007) show that one-way communication from a manager is
more effective than financial incentives alone in overcoming coordination failure between
employees. More broadly, communication has also been observed to affect transfers in the
dictator game (e.g., Andreoni & Rao (2011), Mohlin & Johannesson (2008), and Bohnet
& Frey (1999)) and offers in the ultimatum bargaining game (Zultan 2012). Andreoni &
Rao (2011), for example, find that communication from the receiver increases transfers,
and conclude that this effect stems largely from heightened empathy of dictators. While
receivers in Andreoni & Rao (2011) were allowed to make specific transfer requests from
the dictator, Zultan (2012) reports that communication does not have to be ’strategic’ to
be effective: even when pre-play communication was restricted to topics other than the
game itself, offers in the ultimatum bargaining game were higher than without pre-play
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communication. Could it thus be that the interpersonal communication involved is the
real driver behind the hypothesized value of transparency? The second goal of our paper
is to address this question.2
Knowledge about the motivating mechanism is of great relevance for practitioners, be-
cause of its implication for the management of transparency in the workplace. For example,
if the value of transparency derived primarily from the provision of uncertainty-reducing
information, the timing of communication would be crucial: information disclosure would
only be motivating, as long as the involved information had not started to diffuse within the
organization. If, however, employees mainly responded to the interpersonal communication
from managers, disclosure would actually be motivating beyond this point of information
diffusion.
To achieve both our research goals, we design an experiment, which consists of a series
of one-shot principal-agent games. In each iteration of the game a principal is matched with
a different agent who needs to choose effort, which is costly for the agent and beneficial for
the principal. The principal has an information advantage compared to the agent. That
is, the principal knows the agent’s exogenously assigned wage level prior to the agent’s
effort choice. Importantly, she also has the opportunity to disclose it to the agent via a
costly, fixed-form message. Without disclosure, non-transparency prevails, which implies
that the agent faces uncertainty about his wage level when choosing his effort: all he knows
is that a random draw determines whether his wage level will be high or low and that both
outcomes are equally likely.
This experimental condition, labeled Informative Transparency, allows us to measure
the causal effect of transparency on performance, and to calculate separate values of trans-
2A growing literature discusses the positive association between empathy and trust (see e.g., Feng
et al. (2004), Silvester et al. (2007), Williams (2007), and Williams (2012)). Accordingly, evidence in
support of communication as the primary motivating mechanism would still be consistent with the view
in Schnackenberg & Tomlinson (2014) that transparency improves performance through greater trust in
organization-stakeholder relationships.
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parency for the disclosure of the low and the high wage. While it is intuitive to assume that
the disclosure of good news is more motivating than the disclosure of bad news, it is less
clear whether the disclosure of bad news is motivating at all. We are unaware of previous
research on this question. Furthermore, observing a series of one-shot interactions enables
us to study the values of transparency when subjects gain experience. These values are of
central interest for decision makers, because in most organizational contexts, both agents
and principals are experienced with the setting.
In a control condition, labeled Uninformative Transparency, we remove one of the
central components of the game: the principal’s information advantage. Now, both the
principal and the agent are always truthfully informed about the wage level. All other
aspects of the Informative Transparency condition remain the same. In particular, the
principal can still disclose the wage level to the agent via a costly, fixed-form message.
However, it is common knowledge that such disclosure does not reduce uncertainty for
the agent as there is no informational value of interpersonal communication. Comparing
agent’s effort choices across the two experimental conditions thus allows us to distinguish
between uncertainty-reducing information provision and the interpersonal communication
involved as the motivating mechanism behind the value of transparency.
Our experiment shows that transparency has a causal effect on agents’ behavior, and
that the value of transparency is considerable. In particular, we find a positive value of
transparency for both, the low and the high wage. These findings support the existing no-
tion from scholars in management, psychology, and organization science that transparency
benefits organizational performance. However, counter to the prevailing view in these
disciplines, we do not find that Informative Transparency increases organizational perfor-
mance beyond what Uninformative Transparency does. The key implication of our study
for transparency in organizations is thus that "It does not have to involve news to be mo-
tivating!" Turning to the information disclosure of principals, we show that many of them
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misperceive the value of transparency, and fail to disclose everything they should. This
lack of transparency does not resolve, but instead amplifies when principals gain experience
with the interaction.
Besides having clear managerial relevance, the findings from our study add to existing
knowledge in three different strands of literature. First, our study marks an important em-
pirical contribution to the economic literature on incentives in organizations. Economists
have only recently become interested in the performance implications of transparency in
organizations. Jehiel (2015) provides the first analysis in a moral-hazard setting: he de-
velops a principal-agent model, in which the principal has private knowledge about her
monitoring technology, and the difficulty of the agent’s task, with the opportunity for the
principal to disclose them to the agent. Jehiel shows that the principal can strategically
set the level of transparency to induce higher effort from the agent, and derives conditions
under which it is optimal for the principal not to disclose all her private information to the
agent. Our results complement Jehiel’s work insofar as they provide new insights on the
value and motivating mechanism of transparency in a different organizational setting.
Second, our study informs research on persistent productivity differences among seem-
ingly similar enterprises. Gibbons & Henderson (2013) provide an extensive review of this
literature and report that several studies in this area find a positive correlation between
a firm’s performance and its adoption of ’high-performance work systems’. Among these
systems, communication, in particular, the sharing of information with employees in a
timely manner, features prominently. Our findings extend this literature and show that
communication can indeed have a causal effect on firm performance.
Third, our study extends the literature on communication in principal-agent relation-
ships. Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) and Charness & Dufwenberg (2011) report that
communication is effective in a setting with hidden action, and hidden information, re-
spectively. Their settings differ from our setting, because they look at relationships, in
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which the agent has an information advantage, while we look at relationships, in which the
principal has an information advantage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our experimental
design. Section 3 presents our empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design and procedure
2.1 Experimental conditions
Our experimental design consists of two experimental conditions, Informative Transparency
and Uninformative Transparency, with the latter being the control condition. In both
conditions, principals and agents interact with each other in a series of one-shot games.
The series of games is a repetition of the same principal-agent game, where a principal
and an agent interact with each other at most once. The game consists of two stages and
in each stage the strategy method is used to elicit players’ choices. We first discuss the
Informative Transparency condition.
In the first stage of the game, a random draw determines the wage level of the agent.
It is common knowledge that the realization of the wage w is either low (wL = 80) or
high (wH = 160), and that both outcomes are equally likely. We can thus write the wage
determination process as the lottery L = (pwL, pwH) = (0.5wL, 0.5wH), where pw denotes
the probability for wage level w ∈ {wL, wH}. Furthermore, it is clear that the principal
has no influence on the outcome of this random draw.3 The principal has to submit two
decisions before observing the outcome of the random draw. In particular, she needs to
3By abstracting from the question of responsibility for the wage level, our design excludes any potential
for monetary gift-exchange between principal and agent. Experimental evidence by Charness (2004) shows
that randomly determined wages do not lead to considerable misattribution. However, one of our practice
questions before the experiment asks subjects about the principal’s responsibility for the wage, to make
sure that they are aware of the wage determination procedure. Another way to think about this aspect
of our design is that the fixed-wage level stems from decisions made at a higher management level in the
organization, or from external regulations such as a minimum wage.
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decide for each possible wage level if she wants to disclose it to the agent by engaging
in one-sided, costly communication. Such communication can only occur via a truthful,
pre-defined, fixed-form message that also includes the outcome of the random draw.4
The justification for these three features of communication is as follows. First, we design
communication to be costly to mirror managers’ opportunity cost of communication in real-
world settings. Second, we implement communication as a fixed-form, written message to
keep the wording and communication styles constant across principals and wage levels. We
also informed agents that principals have no influence on the style or content of the message
nor have to type the message themselves. In consequence, communication cannot induce
agent responses to real-effort from principals. Third, we restrict principals to truth-telling
in our game, since we are not interested in studying principals’ use of communication to
outwit subordinates.
If the principal decides to establish transparency through information disclosure, de-
noted by D = 1, she incurs cost c = 6, otherwise, D = 0 and no costs arise. To cover
communication costs, each principal receives an initial endowment of 10. The principal’s
set of disclosure strategies is given by {(0, 0); (0, 1); (1, 0); (1, 1)}, where for each strategy
the first (respectively second) component indicates whether the low (respectively high)
wage is disclosed or not. For example, if the principal selects the disclosure strategy (1, 0),
then the low wage is disclosed whereas the high wage is not.
In the second stage of the game, the agent needs to make three effort choices, depending
on whether the principal disclosed the low wage, disclosed the high wage, or did not disclose
the wage level. Under transparency, the agent needs to select an integer value from the set
{0, . . . , 80} for the low wage, and from the set {0, . . . , 160} for the high wage, while under
4By including the outcome of the random draw, the message helps agents to understand the specific
workplace situation that they are in, and explains the procedure that led to this situation. Transparency in
our experiment is thus closely linked to the previously mentioned concept of informational fairness, because
"procedures used to determine employee outcomes" (p.3) are a prominent type of relevant information that
employees expect informationally fair supervisors to disclose (Collins & Mossholder 2014).
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non-transparency, the agent is able to select any integer value from the set {0, . . . , 160}.5
The agent’s payoff ΠA depends on his chosen effort level e, and the realization of the wage
level w. In case of non-transparency, the agent’s wage is given by the aforementioned
lottery L. For the principal, the payoff depends on her disclosure decision D, and the
agent’s effort choice e, where each unit of effort is doubled by the experimenter. The
associated payoffs for agents and principals, denoted by ΠA and ΠP respectively, take the
form:
ΠA = w − e where w ∈ {80, 160, L}, and ΠP = 10 + 2e− 6D.
The Uninformative Transparency condition differs from the Informative Transparency
condition insofar as the information advantage of the principal is removed. It is common
knowledge that the agent also learns about the wage level, such that the principal’s commu-
nication will not contain news for the agent. That is, even without information disclosure
from the principal, the agent does not face uncertainty about his wage level. As in the
Informative Transparency condition before, we use the strategy method to elicit players’
choices. Accordingly, the principal needs to submit two disclosure decisions (one for each
possible wage level), and the agent has to submit four effort choices, depending on the wage
level, and whether the principal decided to disclose it. We design this condition to under-
stand to which extent a positive value of transparency in the Informative Transparency
condition is driven by the provision of uncertainty-resolving information. Note that, for
both conditions, standard economic theory predicts that, in equilibrium, the agent will
always choose zero effort since effort is costly. Anticipating this, the principal will never
5Throughout our experiment, it was common knowledge that agents could never lose money from their
effort choice under non-transparency. If an agent had entered an effort level greater than 80 under non-
transparency and ended up with the low wage, his implemented effort level was automatically reduced to
80. We let the computer accept each effort level entry between 0 and 160 in the decision-making stage
of agents under non-transparency to prevent agents from finding out about their wage level by entering
different transfer levels.
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disclose the observed wage level considering it is costly to do so.6
2.2 Experimental procedure
The experiment was run in March 2016 in the experimental laboratory of a large University
in Switzerland.7 In total, we conducted six sessions, of which we randomly allocated three
to the Informative Transparency condition, and three to the Uninformative Transparency
condition. In each session, subjects played at least nine iterations of the game as described
in Section 2.1. To best preserve the nature of one-shot interactions and still allowing
subjects to gain experience, we implemented a perfect stranger matching following the
"no-contagion" protocol by Kamecke (1997). This procedure guaranteed that each of the
N/2 agents interacted with any of the N/2 principals at most once.8
In total, we had 122 participants, which we randomly assigned to one of the two condi-
tions. Each subject participated only once in the experiment. Upon arrival, subjects were
randomly allocated to the roles of principals and agents. Throughout the instructions that
subjects received we used neutral wording and referred to principals as "player B" and
agents as "player A" (see Section E in the Web-Appendix for the instructions). Before the
start of the experiment, subjects had to answer practice questions to make sure that they
understood the experiment, and an experimenter read a summary of the instructions to
the subjects to create common knowledge. After the experiment, we ran a short question-
naire to obtain subjects’ sociodemographic information and motivation for their choices.
On average, each session lasted about 80 minutes and earnings for subjects were around
6Our experimental design can also be interpreted as an extended dictator game with a positive efficiency
parameter and a recipient’s endowment. Similar games have previously been used to model manager-worker
relationships, e.g., Falk & Kosfeld (2006).
7The experiment was computerised using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and was organized and recruited for
with the software hroot (Bock et al. 2014). Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students, excluding
majors related to economics or psychology (see Table A.1 in the Web-Appendix for summary statistics by
condition).
8For all sessions, our goal was to have at least 20 subjects to allow for ten iterations of the one-shot
game. In one session, however, only 18 subjects showed up and thus played only nine iterations.
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Table 1: Overview of experimental conditions
condition number of sessions number of subjects1 average earnings (CHF)2
Informative Transparency 3 60 36.63
Uninformative Transparency 3 62 36.15
N 6 122 36.39
1 Half were in the role of a principal and half in the role of an agent.
2 Earnings include a show-up fee of CHF 22.50.
36 CHF (= 37 USD at the time of the experiment). Table 1 provides detailed information
about the number of sessions and subjects, as well as average earnings per condition.9
As explained in the previous section, we use the strategy method to elicit choices for
both players.10 Using the strategy method allows us to observe the disclosure strategy of
the principal and the effort strategy of the agent. For each agent, we can thus elicit effort
choices for the same wage with and without disclosure, and calculate a separate value of
transparency for the low and for the high wage. In addition, we elicited beliefs for both
players after they had made their decisions. Specifically, each agent had to answer if he
believed that his principal would inform him about the low wage, about the high wage,
and, for each wage level, how many of 100 principals would have informed their agent.
Similarly, each principal had to answer how much effort she expected from her agent for
each of the possible outcomes. To avoid any income effects we did not incentivize belief
elicitation.
9Previously to our main experiment, we conducted a number of sessions with one-shot interactions.
Because this experiment did not allow us to study the role of experience with the communication setting
(which is a central characteristics of transparency in real-world organizations), we now refer to this ear-
lier experiment as the secondary experiment. At the time of the main experiment, we decided to keep all
decision-relevant parameters identical to allow comparisons across both experiments. However, to compen-
sate participants for the longer session duration in the main experiment, we had to increase the show-up fee
by CHF 12.50. We provide information on the secondary experiment in Section C in the Web-Appendix.
10The findings from Brandts & Charness (2011) suggest that treatment effects that are identified with
the strategy method will also be identified using the direct response method. However, using the strategy
method has the advantage that we can analyze decisions within subjects.
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3 Results
We divide the discussion of our experimental results into three parts. In the first part, we
focus on agents’ effort choices in response to the level of transparency that the principal
implements. In the second part, we discuss the value of transparency, and shed light on
its motivating mechanism for organizational performance. In the third part, we focus on
principals’ decision to disclose information, and the factors that influence this decision.
3.1 Agents’ Effort Choices
The left graph in Figure 1 shows agents’ average effort choices across periods in response to
the level of transparency that the principal implemented for the Informative Transparency
condition. It can be seen that informational transparency has a causal effect on effort for
both wage levels: average effort increases from 5.64 under non-transparency to 10.76 and
20.63 in response to disclosure of the low and high wage, respectively. A two-sided Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-rank test shows that effort under non-transparency is indeed signifi-
cantly different from effort under informative transparency for each of the two wage levels
(low wage vs. non-transparency: z = 4.16, p < 0.001; high wage vs. non-transparency:
z = 4.64, p < 0.001).
Next, we look at the results from the Uninformative Transparency control condition,
in which disclosure by the principal does not provide news to the agent. The right graph
in Figure 1 shows agents’ average effort choices across periods in response to information
disclosure in this condition, and reveals that agents’ effort choices are consistently higher
after information disclosure than after non-disclosure. Specifically, average effort increases
from 6.59 to 11.09 and from 13.35 to 22.01 in response to disclosure of the low and high
wage, respectively (two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test: low wage vs. non-
transparency: z = 4.55, p < 0.001; high wage vs. non-transparency: z = 4.62, p < 0.001).
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Figure 1: Average effort choices across periods in the Informative Transparency and Un-
informative Transparency condition
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Notes: Displayed are the means of agents’ average effort choices across periods for different wages and
transparency levels in the Informative Transparency (left) and Uninformative Transparency (right) condi-
tion.
Comparing effort levels across both conditions, we do not observe that effort levels are
consistently higher after disclosure in the Informative Transparency condition than in this
condition (two-tailed, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: low wage: z = 0.34, p = 0.73; high wage:
z = 0.52, p = 0.60). Overall, our data from both conditions present clear evidence that
the level of transparency has a causal effect on effort choices, making it an effective, non-
monetary incentive device. We summarize the previous discussion in our first result:11
Result 1 In both conditions, transparency has a causal effect on effort.
3.2 The value and motivating mechanism of transparency
To shed light on the value of transparency across time, and on its motivating mechanism,
we calculate, for each agent, separately, the value of transparency for the high and for the
11While we derived this result from agents’ average effort choices across periods, Figure B.1 in the
Web-Appendix actually shows that the causal, positive effect of transparency on effort is present in each
individual period of both our experimental conditions.
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low wage. We then estimate variants of the following linear regression model:
Value of Transparencyi,w = β0 + β1uninformativeTransparencyi + β2highWagei,w
+ β3(highWagei,w × uninformativeTransparencyi) + ǫi,w,(1)
where we use the indices i and w to indicate dependence on the individual, and the wage
level, respectively. This latter index w is required, because the regression model involves
two observations for each agent i, one for the low wage, and one for the high wage. Our
choice of indices is thus a direct implication of the strategy method, and the fact that each
agent had to make separate effort choices, depending on the principal’s disclosure decision
and wage level.
In equation (1), Value of Transparency i,w is calculated as twice the change in ef-
fort from agent i through information disclosure for wage level w, minus the princi-
pal’s disclosure cost. Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the value of transparency
for the principal. In the Informative Transparency condition, this value is given by
2 ∗ (e(D = 1)i,w − e(D = 0)i) − 6, and in the Uninformative Transparency condition,
it is given by 2 ∗ (e(D = 1)i,w− e(D = 0)i,w)− 6. That is, in the Informative Transparency
condition the value is always measured based on changes in effort relative to effort under
uncertainty, and in the Uninformative Transparency condition the value is measured based
on changes in effort relative to effort under non-disclosure for the same wage. The vari-
able uninformativeTransparency i indicates if agent i is in the Uninformative Transparency
condition (or not), and highWagei,w is an indicator variable that equals 1 for agent i’s high
wage observation, and 0 for his low wage observation. Finally, highWage × uninforma-
tiveTransparency is an interaction term of highWage and uninformativeTransparency. To
account for correlation across a subject’s choices, we adjust standard errors for clustering
13
on the subject level.12
We estimate variants of equation (1) for three different measurements of the value of
transparency: using average effort choices across all periods (Models 1 and 2), using only
effort choices in period 1 (Models 3 and 4), and using only effort choices in period 9 (Models
5 and 6). These different measurements allow us to shed light on differences in the value
of transparency as participants gain experience with the interaction. Table 2 reports the
associated estimation results. In Models 1, 3, and 5, we only include uninformativeTrans-
parency as a regressor in the model. Accordingly, the Constant in these models measures
the average value of transparency in the Informative Transparency condition across the low
and high wage. We start our discussion of the estimation results with these three models.
Model 1 in Table 2 shows that there exists a significant value of transparency in the
Informative Transparency condition: on average, disclosing the low and the high wage
increases the principal’s payoff by about 14 points. While the value of transparency is about
7 points lower in the Uninformative Transparency condition, this difference fails to achieve
statistical significance. Model 3 uses effort choices in period 1, and shows that the value of
transparency is significantly lower by about 10 points in the Uninformative Transparency
condition when participants are unexperienced with the communication setting.13 Model
5, however, shows that there is no longer a significant difference across conditions when
using effort choices in period 9. Overall, we find that the value of transparency does not
differ across conditions when participants have gained experience with the setting.
In Models 2, 4, and 6, we include all the other regressors from equation (1). Accordingly,
the Constant in these models measures the value of transparency when disclosing the low
wage in the Informative Transparency condition. Model 2 shows that both, the disclosure
12Because of the low number of sessions (6) in our study, we do not cluster standard errors on the session
level.
13This finding is consistent with the results from the secondary experiment, in which participants played
the game only once. We decided to move these results for the Informative Transparency and Uninformative
Transparency condition to the Web-Appendix (see Table C.2), because they do not provide qualitatively
different insights than the findings for period 1 in our main experiment.
14
of the high wage, and the low wage have a statistically significant positive effect on the
principal’s income. For the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition, the value
of transparency is 4.241 and for the high wage it is 19.748. For the low wage, the value of
transparency does not significantly differ in the Uninformative Transparency condition, but
the significant negative coefficient on highWage × uninformativeTransparency shows that
the value of transparency is lower for the high wage in the Uninformative Transparency
condition. As we previously did not find a significant difference in effort choices after
disclosure across both conditions, this result is driven by the significantly lower benchmark
of non-transparency for the high wage in the Informative Transparency condition (compare
Figure 1).
Results in Model 4 use effort choices in period 1, and show qualitatively the same results
as in Model 2. The only notable exception is that the value of transparency for the low wage
in the Informative Transparency condition is marginally insignificant (p = 0.137). However,
as participants gain experience with the setting, we no longer observe a significant difference
in the value of transparency across both conditions. In fact, when using effort choices for
period 9, Model 6 shows that neither the coefficient for uninformativeTransparency nor the
one for highWage × uninformativeTransparency is statistically significant.
Overall, we find clear evidence that the value of transparency is significantly positive
for the disclosure of each wage level. This observation presents first causal evidence for
the prevailing view in the management, psychology, and organization science literature.
In contrast to this view, however, we do not find evidence that the value of transparency
is primarily driven by the disclosure of uncertainty-reducing information to otherwise un-
informed parties. While the value of transparency tends to be significantly lower in the
Uninformative Transparency condition (which it should be according to the prevailing
view) at the beginning of the experiment, the difference across both conditions is no longer
statistically significant when participants gain experience with the setting.
15
Table 2: Value of Transparency in Uninformative Transparency vs. Informative Transparency
Average across Periods Period 1 Period 9
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of
Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency
uninformativeTransparency -6.954 -1.234 -9.960∗∗ -1.877 -6.594 -2.923
(4.756) (2.916) (4.403) (3.368) (5.157) (2.960)
highWage 19.748∗∗∗ 21.133∗∗∗ 19.600∗∗∗
(3.895) (5.095) (4.201)
highWage ×
uninformativeTransparency -11.438∗∗ -16.166∗∗∗ -7.342
(5.023) (5.570) (6.113)
Constant (β0) 14.115
∗∗∗ 4.241∗ 14.767∗∗∗ 4.200 14.400∗∗∗ 4.600∗
(3.681) (2.187) (4.403) (2.789) (3.952) (2.321)
F-Statistic 2.14 11.40∗∗∗ 5.12∗∗ 8.38∗∗∗ 1.63 10.02∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.13
N 122 122 122 122 122 122
Number of clusters 61 61 61 61 61 61
Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.
The Constant in Models 2, 4, and 6 measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition.
The p-values on the Constant in Models (2), (4), and (6) are 0.057, 0.137, and 0.052, respectively
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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We summarize these observations as follows:14
Result 2 A significant, positive value of transparency exists for both, the low wage, and
the high wage. The value of transparency is significantly higher for the high wage than for
the low wage.
Result 3 As participants gain experience with the communication setting, there exists no
difference in the value of transparency across conditions.
Based on these results, we conclude that there exists a significant value of disclosing
bad news and good news to agents, and that the value of transparency in organizations
(where both agents and principals are experienced with the setting) is primarily driven by
the interpersonal communication involved.15
3.3 Principals’ Disclosure Behavior
In our discussion of the principal’s disclosure behavior, we focus again on three different
measurements: the median disclosure decision for each wage across periods, the disclosure
decisions in period 1, and the disclosure decisions in period 9. Figure 2 displays the share
of disclosing principals in the Informative Transparency and Uninformative Transparency
conditions for the median disclosure decision, and shows three different disclosure strategies
that principals choose: disclosure of only the high wage, of both wage levels, and of neither.
14Additional support for our results comes from estimation results for the variants of equation (1) in
each of the remaining periods (displayed in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Web-Appendix). In the simple
regression specification with uninformativeTransparency as the only regressor, the associated coefficient
is insignificant in periods 3 to 9. For the full specification, the coefficient on highWage × uninformative-
Transparency is insignificant in periods 8 and 9, and the Constant is statistically significant on the 10%
level in all but one period (period 4).
15Looking at the differences in the average values of transparency between sessions, we find that the
disclosure of good and bad news is consistently rewarded in all our sessions for the Informative Transparency
condition (both in our main experiment, and in the secondary, one-shot experiment). That is, all these
sessions show a positive value of transparency for both wage levels. For the Uninformative Transparency
condition, the results are more mixed across sessions, such that the positive values of transparency are
more pronounced in some sessions than in others.
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Figure 2: Principals’ disclosure decisions: median decision for each wage across all periods
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Notes: The figures show the share of disclosing principals across wage levels in the Informative Trans-
parency and Uninformative Transparency conditions.
Figure 2 shows that 47 percent of principals in the Informative Transparency condition
disclose both wages. Another 47 percent disclose only the high wage, while the remaining
7 percent of principals choose not to disclose any wage level. This high degree of hetero-
geneity among principals shows that there exists considerable disagreement on the value
of transparency. In view of our previous results on the value of transparency for the high
and the low wage, Figure 2 thus reveals that 54 of the principals in our main condition
disclose wage levels too restrictively, thereby reducing their profits. In the Uninformative
Transparency condition, we find that principals’ behavior is very similar as in our main
condition where disclosure creates informative transparency. For example, 32 percent of
principals still disclose both wages, while another 35 percent disclose only the high wage.
Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we cannot reject the equality of both distributions
(p=0.77).
Looking at the other two measurements, we find a very similar pattern. In Period 1, we
find that 57 percent of principals in the Informative Transparency condition disclose both
wages, and that another 33 percent disclose only the high wage. 10 percent of principals do
not disclose any of the two wages. In the Uninformative Transparency condition, the shares
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of principals who disclose both wages, only the high wage, and neither are 32, 48 and 19
percent, respectively. In period 9, 20 percent of principals in the Informative Transparency
condition, and 50 percent in the Uninformative Transparency condition do not disclose
anything. That is, experience with the situation makes principals less likely to disclose
either wage.16 We summarize the previous discussion in our fourth result.
Result 4 A large share of principals misperceive the value of transparency in both condi-
tions, and fail to disclose both wages. Disclosure becomes less common when participants
gain experience.
To understand the reason for this observed lack of transparency, we studied principals’
beliefs about the value of transparency in both conditions. Our goal was to see if these
beliefs were consistent with the observed value of transparency in the previous subsection.
To this end, we estimated a regression model inspired by Bellemare et al. (2010), in which
we regressed a principal’s disclosure decision on her expected value of transparency.17
For all three measurements (i.e., median disclosure decision, and disclosure decisions
in period 1 and period 9), our results showed that the expected value of transparency was
predictive for principals’ decisions to disclosure. To determine if principals’ beliefs were
indeed similar across conditions, we re-estimated equation (1) for principals’ expected
value of transparency. Comparing the associated results (displayed in Table B.1 in the
Web-Appendix) to our results for the agents in Table 2, we found that principals had
qualitatively correct beliefs about agents’ behavior in period 1, and about their average
behavior across periods. Perhaps surprisingly, however, we also found that gaining ex-
perience led to greater misperception of the value of transparency among principals. In
particular, principals in period 9 underestimated the value of transparency when disclos-
ing the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition, and when disclosing the high
16Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for period 1 and 9 both yield a p-value of 1.00, and thus cannot reject the
equality of distributions across experimental conditions.
17See section B.2 in the Web-Appendix for the exact model specification and estimation results.
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wage in the Uninformative Transparency condition. Additional analyses on the period level
(displayed in Tables B.2 and B.3 in the Web-Appendix) showed that, in the clear majority
of periods, principals misperceived the value of disclosing the low wage in the Informative
Transparency condition.18 We summarize the previous discussion in our last result.
Result 5 Principals’ disclosure behavior is driven by their expectations about the value
of transparency. As they gain experience, principals increasingly misperceive the value of
transparency (particularly for the low wage).
Why does experience not lead to better disclosure decisions of principals? We believe
that the answer lies in a lack of feedback to principals paired with overly optimistic beliefs
at the beginning of the experiment19: At the end of each period, the principal only learns
the agent’s effort choice that corresponds to her (non-)disclosure decision. What she does
not observe, much like principals in the real-world, are the agent’s effort choices for the
states that she did not implement. A principal who is disappointed by the low effort choice
of the agent after information disclosure may thus (wrongly) conclude that transparency
has no value, and decide to save the cost of communication in the future.20
4 Conclusion
In this study we report the findings from a controlled laboratory experiment on the value
of transparency in organizations. Our focus lies on the motivating effect of information
disclosure as one of the three key aspects of transparency (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson
18Additional support for this conclusion comes from the results in the secondary, one-shot experiment.
As shown in Table C.3 in the Web-Appendix, principals in this experiment underestimated the value of
transparency for the low wage in this condition right from the start.
19Tables B.2 and B.3 in the Web-Appendix show that principals’ beliefs about the value of transparency
are substantially revised downwards across periods, because estimated coefficients on the value of trans-
parency decrease across periods.
20We leave the important question about the effect of different feedback mechanisms on principals’
disclosure decisions across multiple periods for future research.
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2014), while keeping the other two aspects of information accuracy and clarity fixed. Our
main result is that disclosure of good and bad information improves performance, and that
transparency does not have to involve news to be motivating.
In spite of the substantial value of transparency that we observe in our experiment,
we acknowledge that there may also be situations, in which transparency backfires. In a
marketing context, for example, Mohan et al. (2015) find that cost transparency increases
customers willingness to buy from a retailer as long as the disclosed information does not
reveal the violation of fairness norms. In their study, willingness to buy from a retailer
decreased when the disclosed information revealed the retailer’s margin to considerably
exceed the industry average (a likely signal for company greed and price unfairness). As
the principal in our experiment did not have any control over the disclosed wage level for
the agent, fairness considerations with regards to the message content (i.e., the allocated
wage level of the agent) did not arise.
Relevant to practitioners, we replicate the well-established, real-world phenomenon of
non-transparency in organizations (WSJ 2012, CNN-Money 2013, BusinessWeek 2000), and
shed light on its origin. Specifically, we show that many individuals systematically misper-
ceive the value of transparency, and that this misperception is amplified when subjects gain
experience with the interactive situation. These results are of concern for decision-makers
in real-world organizations, where the costs of non-transparency can be substantially higher
than in our simplified two-player interaction: while not a possibility for subjects in our
experiment, it is not uncommon for uninformed employees to eventually even leave the firm
for the better. Or, as one Business Week article (BusinessWeek 2000) put it succinctly:
"Keep Employees in the Dark, and They’ll Go Where It’s Light." At the same time, our
results provide hope for practitioners, because they may find the disclosure of information
that has already started to spread within the organization to be equally effective.
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Web-Appendix
A Tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics for the main experiment
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Informative Transparency
age 23.833 6.209 18 58 60
male 0.517 0.504 0 1 60
siblings 0.85 0.36 0 1 60
student 0.933 0.252 0 1 60
swiss 0.667 0.475 0 1 60
Uninformative Transparency
age 23.403 4.927 19 46 62
male 0.435 0.5 0 1 62
siblings 0.820 0.388 0 1 61
student 0.952 0.216 0 1 62
swiss 0.710 0.458 0 1 62
1
Table A.2: Value of Transparency in Uninformative Transparency vs. Informative Transparency (Period 2-5)
Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of
Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency
uninformativeTransparency -10.710∗∗ -3.606 -6.482 -1.467 -5.380 1.634 -6.127 -0.471
(4.748) (3.690) (4.750) (2.888) (5.150) (3.267) (5.679) (3.704)
highWage 18.400∗∗∗ 18.933∗∗∗ 20.867∗∗∗ 20.667
(4.712) (4.208) (4.162) (4.194)
highWage ×
uninformativeTransparency -14.206∗∗ -10.030∗ -14.028∗∗ -11.312∗
(5.556) (5.638) (6.014) (6.045)
Constant (β0) 15.000
∗∗∗ 5.800∗ 12.933∗∗∗ 3.467∗ 13.767∗∗∗ 3.333 14.933∗∗∗ 4.600∗
(3.751) (3.179) (3.631) (2.071) (3.726) (2.246) (4.108) (2.617)
F-Statistic 5.09∗∗ 6.76∗∗∗ 1.86 8.89∗∗∗ 1.09 10.73∗∗∗ 1.16 10.25∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Number of clusters 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.
The Constant in Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Value of Transparency in Uninformative Transparency vs. Informative Transparency (Period 6-8)
Period 6 Period 7 Period 8
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of Value of
Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency Transparency
uninformativeTransparency -4.600 0.391 -6.363 -0.445 -5.882 -1.948
(5.460) (3.302) (4.948) (3.032) (5.191) (2.977)
highWage 19.467∗∗∗ 18.933∗∗∗ 19.867∗∗∗
(4.294) (4.170) (4.258)
highWage ×
uninformativeTransparency -9.983∗ -11.837∗∗ -7.867
(5.936) (5.764) (5.922)
Constant (β0) 13.600
∗∗∗ 3.867∗ 13.267∗∗∗ 3.800∗ 14.333∗∗∗ 4.400∗
(3.859) (2.184) (3.807) (2.234) (4.099) (2.339)
F-Statistic 0.71 9.24∗∗∗ 1.65 8.88∗∗∗ 1.28 10.98∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.13
N 122 122 122 122 122 122
Number of clusters 61 61 61 61 61 61
Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.
The Constant in Models 2, 4, and 6 measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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B Additional evidence from the main experiment
In this section, we provide additional evidence from our main experiment on the dynam-
ics in agents’ effort choices (Section B.1) and principals’ beliefs and disclosure decisions
(Section B.2).
B.1 Dynamics of agents’ effort choices
While we derived Result 1 in the paper from agents’ average effort choices across periods,
Figure B.1 actually shows that the causal, positive effect of transparency on effort is present
in each individual period of both our experimental conditions.
Figure B.1: Mean effort choices in each period in the Informative Transparency and Un-
informative Transparency conditions
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Notes: Displayed are mean effort choices (across subjects) in each period for different wages and trans-
parency levels in the Informative Transparency (left) and Uninformative Transparency (right) condition.
For example, mean effort choices in the first period of the Informative Transparency
condition (left) are 23.83, 13.27, and 8.17 (from top to bottom in the graph). In the ninth
period, the corresponding values are 20.43, 10.63, and 5.33.21 Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-rank tests confirm that effort after disclosure is significantly different from effort
without disclosure in both periods (period 1: low wage vs. non-transparency: z = 3.63,
p < 0.001; high wage vs. non-transparency: z = 4.46, p < 0.001; period 9: low wage
vs. non-transparency: z = 4.22, p < 0.001; high wage vs. non-transparency: z = 4.39,
p < 0.001). In the Uninformative Transparency condition (right), mean effort choices in the
first period are 26.35, 19.71, 13.58, and 9.42 (again, from top to bottom in the graph). In the
ninth period, the corresponding values are 20.74, 10.77, 9.65, and 5.81. Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank tests confirm again that effort after disclosure is significantly different
from effort without disclosure in both periods (period 1: low wage vs. non-transparency:
21We focus on the ninth period, because this is the last period that all our participants completed. See
also footnote 8 in the paper.
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z = 4.41, p < 0.001; high wage vs. non-transparency: z = 4.49, p < 0.001; period 9:
low wage vs. non-transparency: z = 4.24, p < 0.001; high wage vs. non-transparency:
z = 4.41, p < 0.001).
B.2 Principals’ beliefs and disclosure decisions
In this subsection, we provide details on our regression model and estimation results for
principals’ beliefs and disclosure decisions. As mentioned in the paper, we base our analysis
on a regression model inspired by Bellemare et al. (2010), and assume that each principal
compares her expected payoffs under disclosure (Ei(ΠD=1)) with those under non-disclosure
(Ei(ΠD=0)):
Ei(ΠD=1) = β(4 + 2Ei(eD=1)) + ǫi,D=1 (2)
Ei(ΠD=0) = β(10 + 2Ei(eD=0)) + ǫi,D=0, (3)
where the principal always has an endowment of 10, but information disclosure leads to
costs of 6. In addition, Ei(eD=1) and Ei(eD=0) denote the principal’s beliefs about agent
effort in response to disclosure and non-disclosure, respectively.22 To allow for suboptimal
choices by principals we always include an error term (ǫi,D=0 and ǫi,D=1). Under the
assumption that both error terms follow independent Normal distributions, we can estimate
the probability to disclose information by means of a binary Probit model:
Prob(D = 1) = φǫ(β(2(Ei(eD=1)−Ei(eD=0)− 6)) (4)
Accordingly, a principal will disclose her information if the expected value of trans-
parency is positive. Model 1 in Table B.1 shows the associated results when using the
median beliefs and disclosure decisions across periods. We see that the expected value of
transparency is indeed predictive for principals’ decisions to disclosure. Looking at Models
3, and 5, we observe the same result when analyzing principals’ behavior in periods 1 and
9.
To determine if principals’ beliefs are indeed similar across conditions, we regress the
expected value of transparency on characteristics of the situation (paralleling our approach
in equation (1) of the paper for the agents). In particular, we want to know if the wage
level and being in the Informative Transparency condition have predictive power for a
principal’s expected value of transparency. Models 2, 4, and 6 in Table B.1 address this
question, and use the disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condi-
tion as the omitted category. In Models 2 and 4, we find a significant positive expected
value of transparency of 5.200 and 5.733 when disclosing the low wage in the Informative
Transparency condition, respectively. At the same time, we observe a significant positive
expected value of transparency for the disclosure of the high wage in this condition, and
that this value is significantly lower in the Uninformative Transparency condition (as indi-
cated by the significant negative coefficient on highWage × uninformativeTransparency).
22Recall that we elicited principals’ beliefs after their communication decisions.
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Comparing these results with our results for the agents in Table 2 in the paper, we find
that principals have qualitatively correct beliefs about agents’ behavior in period 1, and
about their average behavior across periods.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, we find that principals misperceive the value of trans-
parency when they gain experience. Model 6 shows that by period 9, principals underes-
timate the value of transparency when disclosing the low wage in the Informative Trans-
parency condition (as indicated by the insignificant coefficient of 0.733 on the Constant),
and when disclosing the high wage in the Uninformative Transparency condition (as indi-
cated by the significant, negative interaction term in this model). To shed further light on
principals’ beliefs, we estimated the full regression model separately for each of the nine
periods. The results, displayed in Tables B.2 and B.3 in this Web-Appendix, show that
the coefficient on the Constant is significantly positive only in the first three periods. That
is, in the clear majority of periods, principals misperceive the value of disclosing the low
wage in the Informative Transparency condition.
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Table B.1: Principals’ communication decisions and beliefs
Median across Periods Period 1 Period 9
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
expected expected expected
D=1 value of transparency D=1 value of transparency D=1 value of transparency
Expected value of transparency 0.021∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
uninformativeTransparency -4.748 -4.443 -2.991
(2.921) (4.173) (2.526)
highWage 17.600∗∗∗ 39.333∗∗∗ 13.333∗∗∗
(3.319) (4.551) (3.341)
highWage ×
uninformativeTransparency -10.406∗∗∗ -27.075∗∗∗ -8.753∗∗
(3.799) (5.876) (3.745)
Constant - 5.200∗∗ - 5.733∗ - 0.733
(2.413) (3.689) (2.032)
Wald χ2 / F-Statistic 14.59∗∗∗ 15.59∗∗∗ 9.46∗∗∗ 29.65∗∗∗ 7.07∗∗∗ 9.15∗∗∗
(Pseudo) R2 0.22 0.24 0.13 0.38 0.12 0.19
N 122 122 122 122 122 122
Number of clusters 61 61 61 61 61 61
Probit regressions report marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.
The Constant measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.2: Principals’ communication decisions and beliefs (Period 2-5)
Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
expected value expected value expected value expected value
D=1 of transparency D=1 of transparency D=1 of transparency D=1 of transparency
Expected value of transparency 0.007∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
uninformativeTransparency -1.467 -5.108 -3.308 -1.389
(3.200) (3.748) (3.527) (3.427)
highWage 26.400∗∗∗ 27.733∗∗∗ 22.333∗∗∗ 18.333∗∗∗
(4.449) (4.950) (4.635) (3.921)
highWage ×
uninformativeTransparency -20.400∗∗∗ -17.282∗∗∗ -17.753∗∗∗ -9.366∗∗
(4.831) (6.246) (6.595) (4.578)
Constant - 5.467∗∗ - 8.333∗∗∗ - 2.533 3.067
(2.631) (3.140) (2.857) (2.685)
Wald χ2 / F-Statistic 5.58∗∗ 15.34∗∗∗ 9.20∗∗∗ 13.11∗∗∗ 3.01∗ 8.94∗∗∗ 6.47∗∗ 12.53∗∗∗
(Pseudo) R2 0.08 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.07 0.17 0.05 0.17
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Number of clusters 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Probit regressions report marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.
The Constant measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.3: Principals’ communication decisions and beliefs (Period 6-8)
Period 6 Period 7 Period 8
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
expected expected expected
D=1 value of transparency D=1 value of transparency
Expected value of transparency 0.009∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
uninformativeTransparency -5.344 -3.585 -3.667
(3.342) (3.248) (3.209)
highWage (d) 15.600∗∗∗ 14.600∗∗∗ 13.867∗∗∗
(3.676) (4.535) (3.612)
highWage ×
uninformativeTransparency -7.794∗ -7.632 -8.125∗∗
(4.368) (5.014) (3.917)
Constant - 3.667 - 3.133 - 1.667
(2.664) (2.829) (2.874)
Wald χ2 / F-Statistic 6.40∗∗ 10.44∗∗∗ 10.55∗∗∗ 9.19∗∗∗ 18.33∗∗∗ 11.94∗∗∗
(Pseudo) R2 0.07 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.17
N 122 122 122 122 122 122
Number of clusters 61 61 61 61 61 61
Probit regressions report marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.
The Constant measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C Evidence from the secondary experiment
C.1 Experimental Procedure
Besides the main experiment that we discuss in the paper, we also conducted a one-shot
version of the experiment in October 2011, run in the same experimental laboratory as
the main experiment.23 As in the main experiment, we used the strategy method to elicit
choices for both players, and we also elicited players’ beliefs.
In addition to the Informative Transparency and Uninformative Transparency con-
ditions, this experiment included one additional control condition, which we refer to as
Passive Agent. In this condition, we introduced an external random device for the the
agent’s effort selection. That is, the agent could not choose effort himself. Instead, his
effort was determined by a lottery, where each outcome e ∈ {0, 5, 10, 25, 50} had the same
probability to occur, namely 20%. The realized outcome was binding for both players and
thus also relevant for their payoffs. In spite of agents’ inability to select their effort choice,
agents were always represented by real subjects. As in the other experimental conditions,
principals had to submit two disclosure decisions, one for each wage level. By comparing
disclosure decisions of principals across this condition and the Informative Transparency
condition, we could determine if principals used disclosure to influence agents’ effort levels,
or whether they regarded disclosure as a social norm.
In total we had 178 participants, which we randomly assigned to one of the three
conditions. Each subject participated only once. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly
allocated to the roles of principals and agents. Throughout the instructions that subjects
received we used neutral wording and referred to principals as "player B" and agents as
"player A" (see Section E in this Web-Appendix for the instructions). Before the start of the
experiment, subjects had to answer practice questions to make sure that they understood
the experiment, and an experimenter read a summary of the instructions to the subjects to
create common knowledge. After the experiment, we ran a short questionnaire to obtain
subjects’ sociodemographics and motivation for their choices. In total we conducted nine
sessions, of which each lasted on average about one hour. Average earnings for subjects
were around 24 CHF (= 26.64 USD at the time of the experiment). Table C.1 provides
detailed information about the number of sessions and subjects, as well as average earnings
per condition.24
23The experiment was computerised using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and the subjects were recruited us-
ing ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students, excluding majors related
to economics or psychology (see Table D.1 in this Web-Appendix for summary statistics by condition).
24In addition to the sessions listed in Table 1 we ran a pilot session with 20 subjects. In this session, we
included the show-up fee in the wages, i.e., the agent received either 130 or 210 points and the principal
received 60 points as fixed wages. Subsequently, we decided to separate the show-up fee from the wages to
make it simpler for subjects. We also conducted two experimental sessions, in which the principal could
not communicate with the agent. Instead a random draw determined if the agent was informed about
his wage level. Because Schnackenberg & Tomlinson (2014) emphasize the role of intentionally shared
information for transparency, this condition is irrelevant for our discussion of the value and motivating
mechanism of transparency in organizations.
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Table C.1: Overview of experimental conditions
condition number of sessions number of subjects1 average earnings (CHF)2
Informative Transparency 4 80 24.24
Uninformative Transparency 4 76 24.06
Passive Agent 1 22 23.35
N 9 178 23.88
1 Half were in the role of a principal and half in the role of an agent. The number of subjects in our study
reflects on our goal to have 80 subjects in the Informative Transparency and Uninformative Transparency
condition –which help determine the value of transparency– and about 20 subjects in the Passive Agent –
which helps to study subjects’ motivations.
2 Earnings include a show-up fee of CHF 10.
C.2 Results for the agents in the Informative Transparency and
Uninformative Transparency condition
The left graph in Figure C.1 shows agents’ effort choices in response to the level of trans-
parency that the principal implemented for the Informative Transparency condition. We
see that effort is considerably higher with transparency about the low and the high wage,
than under non-transparency. Specifically, average effort increases from 9.95 under non-
transparency to 14.62 and 28.12 in response to disclosure of the low and high wage, re-
spectively. A two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test shows that effort under
non-transparency is indeed significantly different from effort with transparency for both
wage levels (low wage vs. non-transparency: z = 2.97, p = 0.003; high wage vs. non-
transparency: z = 4.88, p < 0.001).
Figure C.1: Effort choices in Informative Transparency and Uninformative Transparency
condition in the secondary experiment
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Notes: The panel displays agent effort across wage levels and transparency levels in the Informative
Transparency condition (left) and the Uninformative Transparency condition (right).
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The right graph in Figure C.1 reveals that agents’ effort choices in the Uninformative
Transparency condition are consistently higher after information disclosure than after non-
disclosure. Specifically, average effort increases from 8.29 to 11.21 and from 15.53 to
18.92 in response to disclosure of the low and high wage, respectively (two-sided Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-rank test: low wage vs. non-transparency: z = 4.48, p < 0.001;
high wage vs. non-transparency: z = 4.18, p < 0.001). Comparing effort levels across
both conditions, we observe that effort levels are consistently higher after disclosure in
the Informative Transparency condition than in this condition, although we only find a
significant difference in effort for the high wage (two-tailed, Wilcoxon test: z = −1.85,
p = 0.064; low wage: z = −1.20, p = 0.230).
Estimation results for variants of equation (1) are displayed in Table C.2. Model 1 shows
that the value of transparency is significantly lower by 16.5 points in the Uninformative
Transparency condition than in the Informative Transparency condition. As the value of
transparency in the latter condition is 16.85, this suggests that there is no positive value
of transparency in the Uninformative Transparency condition. In Model 2, we include
the other explanatory variables from equation 1. Accordingly, the agent’s effort change in
response to disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition serves as
the omitted category. We see that the results in Model 2 mirror our findings for period 1
in the main experiment.
Table C.2: The Value of Transparency in Uninformative Transparency vs. Informative
Transparency
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Value of Value of
Transparency Transparency
uninformativeTransparency -16.534∗∗∗ -3.508
(4.510) (3.318)
highWage 27.000∗∗∗
(3.762)
highWage ×
uninformativeTransparency -26.053∗∗∗
(4.028)
Constant (β0) 16.85
∗∗∗ 3.350
(4.294) (3.079)
F-Statistic 13.44∗∗∗ 19.38∗∗∗
R2 0.11 0.25
N 156 156
Number of clusters 78 78
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.
The constant in Model 2 measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the
Informative Transparency condition. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.3 Principals’ Disclosure Behavior
Figure C.2 shows the share of communicating principals across the Informative Trans-
parency and Uninformative Transparency conditions. We observe all four possible disclo-
sure strategies for principals: disclosure of only the low wage, of only the high wage, of
both wage levels, and of neither.
Figure C.2: Principals’ disclosure decisions
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Notes: The figure shows the share of communicating principals across wage levels in the Informative
Transparency and Uninformative Transparency conditions.
In the Informative Transparency condition, 50 percent of principals disclose both wages.
Another 30 percent disclose only the high wage, while another 10 percent disclose only
the low wage. The remaining 10 percent of principals choose not to disclose any wage
level. Principals’ behavior in the Uninformative Transparency condition is very similar.
For example, 40 percent of principals still disclose both wages, while another 30 percent
disclose only the high wage. Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we cannot reject the
equality of both distributions (p=0.779).
The similarity of principals who disclose wages across conditions raises the relevant
question if a fixed share of the population views disclosure as a social norm. Our Passive
Agent control condition allows us to address this question. Recall that in this condition,
the agent has no influence on the resulting effort choice. Instead, a random device selects
an effort level from the set {0, 5, 10, 25, 50} with equal probability. We find that this vari-
ation of the game changes principal behavior dramatically: disclosure breaks down almost
entirely in this condition, as reflected in 91 percent of non-communicating principals.25
Model 1 in Table C.3 shows estimation results for equation (4). We see that the
expected value of transparency is predictive for principals’ disclosure decisions. Model 2
shows the results when regressing the expected value of transparency on different wage
25These findings are based on observations in one session, in which only 1 out of 11 principals disclosed
the low wage. While the number of observation is small, the evidence is highly suggestive.
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levels and experimental conditions. We observe that principals expect a positive value of
transparency for disclosure of the high wage, and that this value is expected to be lower in
the Uninformative Transparency condition. In contrast to the findings for period 1 in the
main experiment, the results for Model 2 show that principals already underestimate the
value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the secondary experiment. Overall,
however, the results are consistent with our conclusions from the main experiment.
Table C.3: Principals’ communication decisions and beliefs
Probit OLS
(1) (2)
D=1 expected
value of transparency
Expected value of transparency 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
uninformativeTransparency -0.276
(4.486)
highWage 38.250∗∗∗
(3.835)
highWage ×
uninformativeTransparency -27.303∗∗∗
(5.126)
Constant 2.750
(3.581)
Wald χ2 / F-Statistic 8.52∗∗∗ 37.85∗∗∗
(Pseudo) R2 0.04 0.27
N 156 156
Number of clusters 78 78
Probit regressions report marginal effects; Robust standard errors
in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters. The Constant measures the
value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the Informative Transparency condition.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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D Tables for the secondary experiment
Table D.1: Summary statistics for the secondary experiment
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Informative Transparency
age 22.7 6.852 18 75 80
male 0.375 0.487 0 1 80
siblings 0.887 0.318 0 1 80
student 0.949 0.221 0 1 79
swiss 0.8 0.403 0 1 80
Uninformative Transparency
age 21.867 2.84 18 36 75
male 0.421 0.497 0 1 76
siblings 0.893 0.311 0 1 75
student 0.973 0.163 0 1 74
swiss 0.697 0.462 0 1 76
Passive Agent
age 21.091 3.054 18 29 22
male 0.318 0.477 0 1 22
siblings 0.773 0.429 0 1 22
student 1 0 1 1 22
swiss 0.682 0.477 0 1 22
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E Instructions
The original instructions were in German. This Appendix reprints a translation of the
instructions used in the Informative Transparency condition and in the Uninformative
Transparency condition of the main experiment and the secondary, one-shot experiment.
The instructions for the additional control condition (Passive Agent) in the secondary ex-
periment follows the same structure and is available upon request from the authors. Note
that the instructions use the neutral words ’player A’ and ’player B’ instead of the words
’agent’ and ’principal’ used in the text.
E.1 Instructions for the main experiment
Welcome to today’s experiment. This experiment helps to analyze individual decision
making. Your earnings in this experiment depend on your decisions, the decisions of other
participants and random draws. Your income and expenses during the experiment will be
calculated in terms of points. The exchange rate is 5 points = CHF 1.
Independent of the decisions during the experiment, each participant receives
50 points = CHF 10. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted
into CHF, and will be paid to you in cash. The payment occurs anonymously. No other
participant will receive information about your payment.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to ask questions aloud or talk to
other participants during any time of the experiment. If you do not comply
with this rule, you will be immediately excluded from the experiment. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your seat to answer
your questions.
Timing of the experiment:
1. You will read these instructions and answer the control questions. The control ques-
tions shall only assert that every participant understood the instructions.
2. The experiment will be performed 10 times. That is, the experiment consists of 10
rounds. However, you will only receive the income from one randomly selected round.
3. At the end of the experiment the computer will select one round of the experiment at
random to determine your payment. Each round has the same probability of being
selected. You should therefore decide in every round as if it is the one relevant for
your payment.
4. After the experiment you will be requested to fill out a short survey. You will
receive your payment subsequently. Your payment consists of your income from
the selected round, the 50 points that you receive independent of all decisions made
in the experiment, and a bonus of CHF 12.50 that all participants are receiving in
addition at the end of the experiment.
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Please keep in mind that all numerical examples in these instructions have
been chosen randomly, and do not represent any hints or suggestions for your
decision during the experiment.
The Experiment
Upon arrival, we randomly assigned the roles of "player A" and "player B" to each partic-
ipant. You are player A.26 Please note, that your role remains the same across
all 10 rounds of the experiment. At the beginning of each round of the experiment,
the computer will randomly match participants into groups of two. Each group consists of
one player A and one player B. You will be matched with a new player B in each round
of the experiment. Thus, you will never interact with a specific player B more than once
in the experiment. 27 You do not have any interactions with members of other groups in
a round. No participant knows his or her matched partner. Your identity and
decisions remain completely anonymous at each moment of the experiment.
Course of each Round of the Experiment
At the beginning of each round, every player A receives either 80 or 160 points. Whether
player A receives 80 or 160 points will be determined by a random draw in each round.
The probability for 80 points is 50% and the probability for 160 is also 50%: For each
group, the computer will draw a random number from the interval [0, 1]. Each number in
this interval has the same drawing probability. If the drawn number is less or equal to 0.5,
then player A receives 80 points. Otherwise player A receives 160 points.
Independent of player A’s points, Player B always receives 10 points at the beginning of
a round. In addition, player B is always truthfully informed about player A’s number of
points.
[Uninformative Transparency :
Player A is always informed about his points. In addition, player A can be personally
informed about his points by player B. Player B can only truthfully inform. By
informing, player B incurs costs of 6 points.]
[Informative Transparency :
Player A does not know how many points he has. He can only be informed about
his points by player B. Player B can only truthfully inform. By informing, player B
incurs costs of 6 points.]
Player A: Decision
Each player A needs to decide how many points to transfer to player B in his group. Only
integer values are feasible. Player A cannot transfer more points than he actually owns.
The experimentalist doubles each point that player A transfers to player B. Each point
26For player B, this sentence read: You are player B.
27For player B, the sentences contained "player A" instead of "player B".
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that player A transfers reduces player A’s income by one point, and increases player B’s
income by two points. In addition, each player A needs to estimate whether player B is
going to inform him personally, and how many players B out of 100 will inform.
Player B: Decision
Before player A makes his decision, player B needs to decide whether to personally inform
player A about his points. Player B can only inform truthfully. By informing, player
B incurs costs of 6 points. If player B decides to personally inform player A, player A
receives the following message:
Hello player A
I just learned that the random draw is X. Thus you received Y points.
I wanted to make sure that you personally receive this information from me.
Kind regards,
Player B
If player B decides against personal information, player A receives the following message:
Player B decided not to inform you personally.
Once player B has made her decision, she needs to estimate the average number of points
that all player A will transfer. Player A’s and player B’s income are calculated as follows:
Player A’s income:
random draw ≤ 0.5: 80 - (transfer to player B)
random draw > 0.5: 160 - (transfer to player B)
Player B’s income:
10 + 2*(transfer from player A) - information costs
[Examples to illustrate the calculation of both players’ income (in points)]
Each round of the experiment consists of two stages:
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Stage 1 Player B needs to decide whether she wants to inform player A about his points.
Afterwards, player B needs to give her estimate.
Stage 2 Player A needs to decide how many points to transfer to player B. In addition, player
A gives his estimates.
Following this general part of the instructions, players A and B received different versions
of the instructions, as described in the following.
[Player A’s specific instructions (Informative Transparency ):
Note that you as player A need to determine your transfer choice before you know which
random number has been drawn and whether player B informs you personally.
At the time of your decision you do not know whether
1. you received 80 points and have been informed by player B.
2. you received 160 points and have been informed by player B.
3. you are not informed about your points.
This implies that you have to make three decisions in each round: For each of the three
possible cases you have to decide how many points you want to transfer to player B.
Note that you cannot incur a loss if you choose to transfer more points than you actually
received (case 3). In this case, your transfer choice will be automatically replaced by your
total number of points. Example: You are not informed about your points and transfer
90 points to player B. In case that you only received 80 points, your transfer will be
automatically reduced to 80 points.
You also need to give your estimates before you know which random number has
been drawn. That is, at the time of your estimation, you do not know whether
1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 160 points.
This implies that you need to give two estimates for each of these cases in each round:
For each possible case you need to estimate whether you will be informed by the player B
in your group, and how many out of 100 player B will inform their player A.
You will enter your choices into the software as follows:
[Screenshot (Decision)]
[Screenshot (Estimation)]
]
[Player B’s specific instructions (Informative Transparency):
Note that you as player B need to make your decision before you know which random
number has been drawn. At the time of your decision you do not know whether player
A
19
1. received 80 points.
2. received 160 points.
This implies that you have to make two decisions in each round: For each of the two
possible cases you have to decide whether you want to personally inform player A about
his points.
You also need to give your estimates before you know which random number has
been drawn. That is, you need to give an estimate for each of the following cases
1. Player A received 80 points and has been informed by player B.
2. Player A received 160 points and has been informed by player B.
3. Player A is not informed about his points.
For each possible case you have to estimate in each round how many points all players A
will on average transfer to player B.
Note that player A cannot incur a loss if he chooses to transfer more points than he
actually received (case 3). In this case, his transfer choice will be automatically replaced
by his total number of points. Example: Player A is not informed about his points and
transfers 90 points to player B. In case that player A only received 80 points, his transfer
will be automatically reduced to 80 points.
You will enter your choices into the software as follows:
[Screenshot (Decision and Estimation)]
]
[Player A’s specific instructions (Uninformative Transparency):
Note that you as player A need to determine your transfer choice before you know which
random number has been drawn and whether player B informs you personally.
At the time of your decision you do not know whether
1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 80 points and have been personally informed by player B.
3. you received 160 points.
4. you received 160 points and have been personally informed by player B.
This implies that you have to make four decisions in each round: For each of the four
possible cases you have to decide how many points you want to transfer to player B.
You also need to give your estimates before you know which random number has
been drawn. That is, at the time of your estimation, you do not know whether
1. you received 80 points.
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2. you received 160 points.
This implies that you need to give two estimates for each of these cases in each round:
For each possible case you need to estimate whether you will be informed by the player B
in your group, and how many out of 100 player B will inform their player A.
You will enter your choices into the software as follows:
[Screenshot (Decision)]
[Screenshot (Estimation)]
]
[Player B’s specific instructions (Uninformative Transparency):
Note that you as player B need to make your decision before you know which random
number has been drawn. At the time of your decision you do not know whether player
A
1. received 80 points.
2. received 160 points.
This implies that you have to make two decisions in each round: For each of the two
possible cases you have to decide whether you want to personally inform player A about
his points.
You also need to give your estimates before you know which random number has
been drawn. That is, you need to give an estimate for each of the following cases
1. Player A received 80 points.
2. Player A received 80 points and has also been personally informed by player B.
3. Player A received 160 points.
4. Player A received 160 points and has also been personally informed by player B.
For each possible case you have to estimate in each round how many points all players A
will on average transfer to player B.
You will enter your choices into the software as follows:
[Screenshot (Decision and Estimation)]
]
Following the specific parts of the instructions, players A and B received again identical
versions of the instructions, as described in the following.
In each Round:
At the end of each round each player will be shown the random draw for her group, as well
as the relevant decision by player A, and her final points on the computer screen.
End of the experiment:
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At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly draw one of the 10 rounds with
each round having the same probability of being drawn. The round that has been drawn
and is relevant for payment, as well as your income from that round will be shown on the
screen at the end of the experiment.
[4 Comprehension Questions]
E.2 Instructions one-shot Experiment
Welcome to today’s experiment. This experiment helps to analyze individual decision
making. Your earnings in this experiment depend on your decisions, the decisions of other
participants and random draws. Your income and expenses during the experiment will be
calculated in terms of points. The exchange rate is 5 points = CHF 1.
Independent of the decisions during the experiment, each participant receives
50 points = CHF 10. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted
into CHF, and will be paid to you in cash. The payment occurs anonymously. No other
participant will receive information about your payment.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to ask questions aloud or talk to
other participants during any time of the experiment. If you do not comply
with this rule, you will be immediately excluded from the experiment. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your seat to answer
your questions.
Timing of the experiment:
1. You will read these instructions and answer the control questions. The control ques-
tions shall only assert that every participant understood the instructions.
2. The experiment will be performed once.
3. After the experiment you will be requested to fill out a short survey. You will receive
your payment subsequently.
Please keep in mind that all numerical examples in these instructions have
been chosen randomly, and do not represent any hints or suggestions for your
decision during the experiment.
The Experiment
Upon arrival, we randomly assigned the roles of "player A" and "player B" to each par-
ticipant. You are player A.28 At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will
randomly match participants into groups of two. Each group consists of one player A and
one player B. You do not have any interactions with members of other groups. No par-
ticipant knows his or her matched partner. Your identity and decisions remain
completely anonymous at each moment of the experiment.
28For player B, this sentence read: You are player B.
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At the beginning of this experiment, every player A receives either 80 or 160 points.
Whether player A receives 80 or 160 points will be determined by a random draw. The
probability for 80 points is 50% and the probability for 160 is also 50%: For each group,
the computer will draw a random number from the interval [0, 1]. Each number in this
interval has the same drawing probability. If the drawn number is less or equal to 0.5, then
player A receives 80 points. Otherwise player A receives 160 points.
Independent of player A’s points, Player B always receives 10 points at the beginning of the
experiment. In addition, player B is always truthfully informed about player A’s number
of points.
[Uninformative Transparency :
Player A is always informed about his points. In addition, player A can be personally
informed about his points by player B. Player B can only truthfully inform. By
informing, player B incurs costs of 6 points.]
[Informative Transparency :
Player A does not know how many points he has. He can only be informed about
his points by player B. Player B can only truthfully inform. By informing, player B
incurs costs of 6 points.]
Player A: Decision
Each player A needs to decide how many points of his endowment to transfer to player
B in his group. Only integer values are feasible. Player A cannot transfer more points
than he actually owns. The experimentalist doubles each point that player A transfers to
player B. Each point that player A transfers reduces player A’s income by one point, and
increases player B’s income by two points. In addition, each player A needs to estimate
whether player B is going to inform him personally, and how many players B out of 100
will inform.
Player B: Decision
Before player A makes his decision, player B needs to decide whether to personally inform
player A about his points. Player B can only inform truthfully. By informing, player
B incurs costs of 6 points. If player B decides to personally inform player A, player A
receives the following message:
Hello player A
I just learned that the random draw is X. Thus you received Y points.
I wanted to make sure that you personally receive this information from me.
Kind regards,
Player B
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If player B decides against personal information, player A receives the following message:
Player B decided not to inform you personally.
Once player B has made her decision, she needs to estimate the average number of points
that all player A will transfer. Player A’s and player B’s income are calculated as follows:
Player A’s income:
random draw ≤ 0.5: 80 - (transfer to player B)
random draw > 0.5: 160 - (transfer to player B)
Player B’s income:
10 + 2*(transfer from player A) - information costs
[Examples to illustrate the calculation of both players’ income (in points)]
The experiment consists of two stages:
Stage 1 Player B needs to decide whether she wants to inform player A about his points.
Afterwards, player B needs to give her estimate.
Stage 2 Player A needs to decide how many points to transfer to player B. In addition, player
A gives his estimates.
Following this general part of the instructions, players A and B received different versions
of the instructions, as described in the following.
[Player A’s specific instructions (Informative Transparency):
Note that you as player A need to determine your transfer choice before you know which
random number has been drawn and whether player B informs you personally.
At the time of your decision you do not know whether
1. you received 80 points and have been informed by player B.
2. you received 160 points and have been informed by player B.
3. you are not informed about your points.
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This implies that you have to make three decisions: For each of the three possible cases
you have to decide how many points you want to transfer to player B.
Note that you cannot incur a loss if you choose to transfer more points than you actually
received (case 3). In this case, your transfer choice will be automatically replaced by your
total number of points. Example: You are not informed about your points and transfer
90 points to player B. In case that you only received 80 points, your transfer will be
automatically reduced to 80 points.
You also need to give your estimates before you know which random number has
been drawn. That is, at the time of your estimation, you do not know whether
1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 160 points.
This implies that you need to give two estimates for each of these cases: For each
possible case you need to estimate whether you will be informed by the player B in your
group, and how many out of 100 player B will inform their player A.
You will enter your choices into the software as follows:
[Screenshot (Decision)]
[Screenshot (Estimation)]
]
[Player B’s specific instructions (Informative Transparency):
Note that you as player B need to make your decision before you know which random
number has been drawn. At the time of your decision you do not know whether player
A
1. received 80 points.
2. received 160 points.
This implies that you have to make two decisions: For each of the two possible cases you
have to decide whether you want to personally inform player A about his points.
You also need to give your estimates before you know which random number has
been drawn. That is, you need to give an estimate for each of the following cases
1. Player A received 80 points and has been informed by player B.
2. Player A received 160 points and has been informed by player B.
3. Player A is not informed about his points.
For each possible case you have to estimate how many points all players A will on average
transfer to player B.
Note that player A cannot incur a loss if he chooses to transfer more points than he
actually received (case 3). In this case, his transfer choice will be automatically replaced
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by his total number of points. Example: Player A is not informed about his points and
transfers 90 points to player B. In case that player A only received 80 points, his transfer
will be automatically reduced to 80 points.
You will enter your choices into the software as follows:
[Screenshot (Decision and Estimation)]
]
[Player A’s specific instructions (Uninformative Transparency):
Note that you as player A need to determine your transfer choice before you know which
random number has been drawn and whether player B informs you personally.
At the time of your decision you do not know whether
1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 80 points and have been personally informed by player B.
3. you received 160 points.
4. you received 160 points and have been personally informed by player B.
This implies that you have to make four decisions: For each of the four possible cases
you have to decide how many points you want to transfer to player B.
You also need to give your estimates before you know which random number has
been drawn. That is, at the time of your estimation, you do not know whether
1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 160 points.
This implies that you need to give two estimates for each of these cases: For each
possible case you need to estimate whether you will be informed by the player B in your
group, and how many out of 100 player B will inform their player A.
You will enter your choices into the software as follows:
[Screenshot (Decision)]
[Screenshot (Estimation)]
]
[Player B’s specific instructions (Uninformative Transparency):
Note that you as player B need to make your decision before you know which random
number has been drawn. At the time of your decision you do not know whether player
A
1. received 80 points.
2. received 160 points.
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This implies that you have to make two decisions: For each of the two possible cases you
have to decide whether you want to personally inform player A about his points.
You also need to give your estimates before you know which random number has
been drawn. That is, you need to give an estimate for each of the following cases
1. Player A received 80 points.
2. Player A received 80 points and has also been personally informed by player B.
3. Player A received 160 points.
4. Player A received 160 points and has also been personally informed by player B.
For each possible case you have to estimate how many points all players A will on average
transfer to player B.
You will enter your choices into the software as follows:
[Screenshot (Decision and Estimation)]
]
Following the specific parts of the instructions, players A and B received again identical
versions of the instructions, as described in the following.
End of the experiment:
At the end of the experiment each player will learn the random draw for her group, as well
as the relevant decision by player A, and her final points.
[4 Comprehension Questions]
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